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TSHUMA: GROUP LITIGATION
TOWARDS GROUP LITIGATION IN ZIMBABWE
Lawrence Tshuma1
... before the law s tands  a door-keeper  on guard . To  this door-keeper  comes a man from the coun try  who begs
for ad m it tan ce  to the  Law. B u t  the  door-keeper  says t h a t  he cannot  adm it  the  m an  a t  the moment.  The  man
on reflection, asks if he will be allowed then  to en te r  later.  I t  is possible answers the  door-keeper ,  b u t  not a t  this
m oment.  Since the  door leading in to  the  law s tands  open as usual and the  door-keeper  steps to  one side, the  man
bends down to peer th rough  the  entrance .  W hen the  door-keeper  sees th a t ,  he laughs and says if you are so
strongly tem p ted  t ry  to get in w ithout  my permission. B u t  note  t h a t  I am powerful. And I am the  lowest
door-keeper .  F rom  hall to hall, keepers s tand  at every door, one more powerful t h a n  the  o ther.  Even  the  th ird
of these has an aspect th a t  even I c anno t  bear  to look at.  These are difficulties which the  man from the  country
has not expected  to  meet, the  Law, he thinks,  should be accessible to  every m an  and a t  all times, and when he
looks at the  d oor-keepe r  in his furred robe, and his large pointed  nose and  long th in  T a r t a r  beard ,  he decides th a tohe had b e t te r  wait until  he gets permission to enter.
Introduction
(i) A bus overturns. A number of passengers are injured and others lose their lives. The 
injured persons and dependants of those killed wish to sue the bus operator.
(ii) Many infants are born deformed. It is established that the cause of their deformity is a 
drug that their mothers have taken, and which was manufactured and marketed by a large 
company. Their parents wish to sue the company.
(iii) A multi-national corporation dismisses all contract workers from its countrywide 
agricultural estates. It is established that the workers, who are not members of any trade 
union, have been working for the company for two years on three monthly contracts 
which have been renewed at the end of each three monthly period. The workers wish to 
sue the company.
(iv) A group of residents wish to sue a local mining company for environmental degradation. 
They wish to sue on behalf of themselves and future generations who, they claim, will be 
deprived of the beauty of the locality.
(v) A large group of squatters who have been living in an area for two years wish to sue the 
Ministry of Health for failure to provide them with medical facilities. They seek a 
mandamus against the Ministry.
(vi) A group of peasants wish to obtain a mandamus against the Ministry of Water 
Development. They allege that the Ministry has failed to provide them with clean water 
despite the government’s policy to supply clean water to all by the year 1989.
(vii) The Child Protection Society wishes to sue a certain religious sect for failure to have 
children of the members of the sect vaccinated.
Is the door to the law open to the above groups? If so, how many door-keepers stand 
guard before the law? Will the door-keepers admit any of the above groups to the law? If so, on 
what conditions?
This article seeks to look at the problems that are likely to be encountered by a group that 
seeks to vindicate the rights of its members, or those whose interests it represents through 
litigation. There are two types of groups contemplated:
Lecturer, Departm ent o f P rivate Law, University of Zimbabwe. 
Kafka; The Trial; Penguin M odem  Classics, 1987, at 235.
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(a) Standing groups, that is groups with permanent structures which are set up to promote or 
fight against certain government policies, or to promote or fight against certain private 
interests.
(b) Ad hoc groups which are set up for purposes of pursuing specific litigation.
Some groups may litigate not only because they want to win in court, but also for other 
objectives, for example, publicity. Litigation may be perceived as one element in the group’s 
campaign strategy. Whatever strategy is adopted and whatever objectives are pursued, these groups 
have to jump several hurdles that the legal system has placed in front of them, before they can 
successfully vindicate the rights of their members or those they represent. The problems that face 
groups which seek to litigate arise mainly from the essentially individualistic nature of 
Zimbabwean civil procedural law.
This article discusses:
(a) The nature of Zimbabwean civil procedural law,
(b) Provisions in Zimbabwean civil procedural law which permit representation of group 
interests and their shortcomings, and
(c) How representation of group interests may be used to facilitate the extension of 
democratic rights to those, who as individuals, have no access to courts and have no other 
ways of realising and enforcing their rights.
The nature of Zimbabwean Procedural Law
Zimbabwean civil procedure is modelled on English procedure. On colonising Zimbabwe, 
the British provided that, save for the provision for the application of customary law in certain 
limited and defined instances, the law to be administered in the then colony would be the law in 
force at the Cape of Good Hope on 10th June 1891 as modified by subsequent legislation.3 The 
substantive law of the Cape in 1891 was basically Roman-Dutch law with a certain degree of 
English influence. It has been said that in the area of procedural institutions. English lav. left an 
unmistakable impression on Cape Law.4
An analysis of Zimbabwean civil procedural law would be incomplete and inadequate if 
it failed to take cognisance of the influence of English law. English procedural law is predicated 
on, or derives from, the classical division between private and public law.5 According to the 
division, private law governs interpersonal relationships. It covers the domain of contract, tort 
(delict) and property. In their daily intercourse individuals bargain in the shadow of the law 
which they may choose to modify or abandon through contract.6 The laws of contract, delict and 
property define the substantive rights and remedies which individuals have between themselves. 
Civil procedural law provides individuals with a machinery for activating or mobilising 
substantive law for the purposes of asserting their private substantive rights. The state has no 
concern whether individuals enforce legal rights available to them, much less whether they invoke 
the procedure of the law.7
In contradistinction to private law is public law. Public law describes those rights and 
interests which are perceived or deemed to be so general and pervasive as to require state 
protection. The state does not generally leave it to those individuals who suffer as a result of an
3
4
5
6 
7
Section 19 of the High Commissioner's Proclam ation o f 10th June 1891, s 26 of the M atebeleland Order In
Council 1894, s49 o f the Southern Rhodesia Order In Council 1898.
Herbstein and Van W insen, page 3.
Cappelletti and Garth, "Finding An Appropriate Compromise" 1983 Civil Justice Quarterly, 115. 
Cappelletti and Garth, op. cit. 115.
Cappelletti and Garth, op. c it .115.
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infringement of public rights or interest to invoke or mobilise the law. Rather, the state arrogates 
to itself the right to bring to book those infringing public rights.
The private law - public law distinction found justification in the laissez-faire theories which 
were current in nineteenth century Europe. According to the theories, the state had an important 
role to play in the maintenance of law and order in the interest of the general public. The 
maintenance of law and order justified state intervention in the interest of the general public once 
a public right was infringed. Furthermore, it justified state provision and initiation of procedures' 
to remedy any public wrong. In private affairs, the state was perceived as having a limited role 
to play. That limited role did not go beyond providing a machinery or a procedure for the 
vindication of private rights. The decision to initiate proceedings or to mobilise the machinery of 
justice for the vindication of private rights was left to the individuals or parties concerned.
The perceived limited role of the state in legal matters was consonant with the laissez- 
faire economic theories of the day which advocated non-intervention by government in economic 
affairs. In the legal sphere, laissez-faire theories advocated the freedom and sanctity of contract 
and the freedom to use and deal with property as the owner saw fit. Any infringement of the 
freedom and sanctity of contract and the freedom to use and deal with property was therefore 
outside the scope of government obligations. It was left to the aggrieved party to mobilise the 
machinery of justice to remedy the infringement. Thus the right to initiate proceedings to remedy 
the infringement of a private right became a right akin to a property right. The person in whom 
the right vested had the freedom to choose either to initiate proceedings to remedy the 
infringement or to turn a blind eye to it.
In theory, any individual whose right had been infringed could invoke the machinery of 
justice to uphold his rights. In this manner was the liberal myth of equality before the law born. 
This ideological cloak served the interests of the bourgeoisie who had overthrown the feudal 
landlords and feudalism. Feudalism institutionalised inequality before the law. Inequality before 
the law under feudalism was one of the rallying points of the bourgeois revolution. To the 
bourgeoisie, equality before the law meant formal and procedural equality. The machinery of 
justice was available to anyone with the means to mobilise it. And not everyone had the means 
to do so.
Thus an individualistic civil procedural system was born. Substantive law rights also are 
individualistic. Only individuals with infringed rights can seek redress using traditional civil 
procedure as the remedy is linked to the individual right. Under an individualistic system, 
litigation is perceived as a bipolar affair with two parties locked in a winner-take-all 
controversy.8 Such a system has no room for groups that seek to use litigation to further their 
ends. As Shivji observes:
........ the  law and the  legal sys tem  disarticula te ,  disorganise and demobilise actual  and potential
opposi t ion /res is tance  to  the  d o m in an t  social order.  In pa r t icu la r  a tom isa tion  and individualisa tion of class 
opposition are built  in the  law form, legal formalities and techniques and legal institutions.®
The bourgeoisie developed a system of civil procedure that excluded groups from the 
courts. In this way they ensured that the dispossessed and disadvantaged would not mobilise and 
organise themselves using the legal system.
The individualistic nature of private law rights and traditional civil procedure is 
underscored by the purpose served by private law remedies. Contractual and delictual remedies
Chayes, "Public Law Litigation And The Burger Court"; 1982 Harvard Law R eview . 4 -5 .
Shivji IG. " W ithin And Beyond Legal Radicalism", in Shivji IG Ed, Limits o f Legal Radicalism, 120
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are linked with an individual’s socio-economic circumstances in the sense that they seek either 
to ensure the realisation of what would have resulted from the performance of a contract or the 
re-establishment of the status quo disturbed by the commission of a delictual act. Traditional legal 
remedies are therefore not designed to facilitate the improvement of a litigant’s socio-economic 
circumstances but simply to restore his or her position to what it was before the contractual or 
delictual wrong was perpetrated.
Attempts have been made to reform traditional civil procedure with a view to 
accomodating groups that seek to use it. In developed capitalist countries the view is that these 
reforms are part of a whole package of reforms made necessary by the welfare state.10 Unlike 
the state in laissez-faire economic theories, the welfare state is seen as having a role to play in 
economic affairs. The state intervenes in the economy and regulates the activities of the 
economically powerful in favour of the weak. New economic, political and social rights which 
favour the weak are created. By their nature, these new rights are available to groups of 
dispossessed and disadvantaged victims of discrimination, consumers of defective products, etc. 
It thus became necessary to have a civil procedural system that permits the representation of group 
interests.11 Several procedural devices were introduced to cater for the new rights.12 An 
example of such procedure is the American Class Action. It developed in response to the demands 
of organisations such as Civil Rights movement. This brave and pioneering procedure has run into 
problems.13
The welfare state was not a result of capitalist philanthropy or magnanimity. Rather, it was 
a result of serious class struggles between capital and labour. The welfare state represents 
concessions by capital at a time when labour was very strong. Of late, state intervention in the 
economy has been perceived as overregulation by capital. There is now a backlash against rights 
introduced during the heyday of the welfare state.14 Civil procedural devices introduced in the 
height of the welfare state have not been very successful in practice.
Attempts have also been made to create and develop group-oriented rights and remedies 
and to transform and transcend traditional civil procedural requirements in some developing 
countries. Social action litigation developed by the Indian Supreme Court immediately comes to 
mind when group litigation in developing countries is discussed. Social action litigation derives 
from the revolutionary and brave interpretation of human rights adopted by the Indian Supreme 
Courts. (Social action litigation is briefly discussed in the section on reforms).
Zimbabwean civil procedural law has neither been touched by reforms associated with the 
welfare state nor by social action litigation. As a result, Zimbabwean civil procedure still retains 
the hallmarks of a bipolar and individualistic procedure.
Representative proceedings in Zimbabwe
(a) The common law position
Under Roman - Dutch common law, it is not possible for a number of plaintiffs with 
separate causes of action against the same defendant to join in one summons unless joinder can 
be justified upon considerations of convenience, which is a court to decide.15 Thus under 
common law the court has a discretion in deciding whether or not to permit a number of plaintiffs 
to sue as a group. In exercising its discretion, the court is guided by considerations of convenience.
10
11
12
13
14
15
For a discussion on th is, see Cappelletti and Barth, op. cit.
C appelletti and Garth op. cit 112.
For a discussion on these, see Cappelletti and Garth, op cit.
For a very interesting discussion, see Chayes, op. cit.
Cappelletti and Garth op. cit 112.
Herbstein and van W insen op. cit 1 6 3 -1G4.
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(b) Order 13. Rule 89
The Common law position has been modified by the Rules of Court. The particular rule 
in question is Rule 89 (1) of the Rules of the High Court.16 Order 13, Rule 89 (1) provides that:
W here num erous persons have the  same interest  in any proceedings, the  proceedings may be begun, and, 
unless the  court  otherwise orders, continued, by or against any one or more of th em  as representing all 
except one or more of them.
This rule received judicial consideration in the case of Wakefield v A.S.A Seeds ( Private) 
Limited.17 18Citing,with approval, the judgment in the English case of John v Rees and Ors.ls 
Goldin J said Rule 89 (1) is a flexible rule of convenience which enables and permits a 
representative suit when a plaintiff represents those who have a common interest and a common 
grievance and seek the same form of relief.19 He went on to say that representative proceedings 
provided for by Rule 89(1) are not the subject of principle but a. tool of convenience in the 
administration of justice.20
What is important to note is that Rule 89 (1), like common law, is predicated on 
considerations of procedural convenience. Since there is no principle of law which requires the 
court to order joinder of parties, it means that it is left to the discretion of the court to determine 
whether or not convenience requires joinder. This poses the first problem for groups which seek 
to litigate. They cannot demand as a matter of legal principle, that the court should permit 
joinder.
The second problem is that in Zimbabwe there has been very little litigation turning on 
the interpretation of Rule 89 (1). This fact is an indication that the procedure, limited as it is, has 
not been tested. Reference will be made to English cases which are based on Rules of the Supreme 
Court Order 15 Rule 12(1) which is worded in exactly the same way as Rule 89 (1). In Smith v 
Cardiff Corporation (Number 1 )21 it was held that to enable an action to be constituted as a 
representative action, the plaintiff must show that all members of the class on whose behalf they 
sued had a common interest in a common subject matter, that all had a common grievance and 
that the relief was in its nature beneficial to them all.22
Thus to satisfy the requirements of procedural convenience, the representative plaintiff 
must show:
(i) a common interest in a common subject matter, and
(ii) a common grievance: and
(iii) an interest beneficial to all concerned.
By imposing the three requirements, the English courts have adopted a restrictive 
interpretation to the Rule. Since Rule 89(1) is based on R.S.C order 15 Rule 12 (1) and since the 
English interpretation of the rule was accepted in Wakefield v A.S.A Seeds (supra), it seems 
reasonable to suggest that the English interpretation in Smith v Cardiff Corporation (supra) will 
be followed by Zimbabwean courts. The requirements of a common interest and a common 
grievance would restrict the representative action to situations where the parties have the same 
cause of action. Thus the action would be available in situations where the causes of action arise 
out of the same breach of contract or the same commission of a delict. As Uff points out, the most
SI No 1047 of 1971
17 1976(2) RLR 63.
18 [1970] Ch D 345 at 370-2 .
19 1976 (2) RLR at 71
20 1976 (2) RLR at 71
21 [1953J2 ALL ER 1373.
22 For a similar formulation, see John v  Rees supra at 370-2 .
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appropriate case under the Rule is an action by or against an unincorporated association such as 
a members’ club.23
The requirement that the relief sought must be beneficial to all whom the plaintiff 
proposes to represent imposes a further restraint on the representative procedure. It follows that 
if the relief sought is only beneficial to a section of the group, thenthe procedure is not available. 
Furthermore, in Market and Co Limited v Knight Steamship Co Limited,24 it was held that
damages cannot be awarded to a representative on behalf of the whole class as they are personal. 
It is submitted that damages can and should be separated from the issue of liability. The 
representative action could then focus on establishing the issue of liability.
On the basis of judicial interpretation of the equivalent section in English law, Rule 89 
is not of much use to groups which seek to use litigation to further their own ends or the ends of 
their members. It is of limited use to ad hoc groups of litigants whose actions arise from the same 
cause of action. It is of limited use to pressure groups that may seek to use the law as part of their 
campaign strategy. Such groups may wish to sue in their own name and not in the name of a 
representative. The limitations of the representative action are understandable if the context in 
which it arose is taken into consideration. For group litigation to succeed, either Rule 89 would 
have to be interpreted in a liberal manner or a new procedure would have to be introduced.
(c) The lead action/test case
The lead action or test case procedure is a procedure whereunder the group does not bring 
individual actions together. Rather, it picks a case or cases that are representative of the rest of 
the cases and brings an action on that or those cases. It stays action on the rest of the cases. The 
aim is to determine liability on the case or cases so chosen. The procedure is appropriate for cases 
which have the same cause of action or where the causes of action arise out of similar fact 
situations. Once liability has been established, the group can then proceed with the rest of the 
cases against the defendant on the issue of damages or whatever remedy is sought. A word of 
caution should be added; the group should ensure that it separates the general issue of liability 
from the particular case. If this is not done there is a danger that the particular case may fail for 
reasons other than merit. This may prejudice the chances of success for the remaining actions.
The lead action/test case procedure is also of limited value to groups that seek to sue in 
their own name. The group may wish to have recourse to the courts to vindicate a right which it 
enjoys as a group. In such a case, the procedure would be of no practical value to the group.
Problems that groups are likely to face
(a) The Issue of Justiciability
A group seeking to vindicate its rights or the rights of members through litigation needs 
to establish whether or not the rights are justiciable. In simple terms, the group needs to establish 
whether or not the breach of the right is capable of being resolved legally through the application 
of legal rules and principles. The interests which the group may seek to vindicate through the legal 
system may not lend themselves to traditional legal methods of dispute resolutions. According to 
Jolowicz;
the  approach of the courts is essentially to t ry  to avoid the b roader  issues of policy by concen tra t ing  on the 
conduct  actual or prospective, of the defendant  in order to see whether  it offends against some rule or principle 
of law .25
Uff K; Class, "Representative and Shareholders Darivative Actions in English Law"; 1986 Civil Justice 
Quarterly 54.
24 [1910] 2 K B.1021.
25 Jolowicz; "Protection of Diffuse, Fragmented and Collective Interest" (1983) 42 Cambridge Law Journal 222.
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Therein lies the rub. The interests that the group may wish to protect or vindicate through 
litigation are more often than not likely to involve broader issues of policy. Take for example a 
group of squatters or peasants which seeks to compel a government department to provide it with 
services. The dispute is likely to involve issues of policy and not law. According to Jolowicz:
W here no directly  applicable legal framework exists such conflicts of interests can be resolved only a t  a political
level if indeed they  can be resolved at a ll .* 278 29
The legal system thus discriminates against certain conflicts of interests. Through 
substantive law requirements, some conflicts of interest are removed from the legal domain and 
are left to be resolved politically. Courts perceive themselves, and are perceived, as individual 
dispute resolution fora. However, disputes or conflicts of interest which come before them must 
be capable of being resolved through the application of some rule or principle of law. 
Unfortunately, most group interests may not be amenable to legal protection. An extension of 
substantive law rights becomes necessary if groups are to use litigation effectively.
(b) Costs
As regards costs, the general rule is that costs follow the event. This is what is generally 
called the indemnity rule of costs. In simple terms, it means that the loser pays the winner’s costs. 
Thus assuming a group finds a representative plaintiff who satisfies the requirements of Rule 89 
and he loses the action, he will have to bear the costs. The same applies to the lead action/test 
case. The plaintiff in the lead action will have to bear the burden of costs in proving liability.
If group litigation is to be successful a way will have to be found around the indemnity 
rule. A fund could be established to assist those groups that pursue public interest litigation. 
Alternatively, contributions could be made by all those affected and interested organisations such 
as non-governmental organisations.
(c) Locus Standi
A group seeking to use litigation to further the interests of its members has to satisfy the 
requirements of standing, that is, it has to show sufficient interest in the subject matter of 
litigation to convince the court that it is the proper party to the proceedings. The interest which 
needs to be shown is a legal one. In Nasionalc Party SWA v Konslilusionale Raad 27 it was held 
that the test for standing is sufficient interest. This is a threshold requirement that has to be 
satisfied before a party can proceed with an action.
In Wood and Ors v Ondangwa Tribal Authority and Another 28 it was held that under 
Roman - Dutch Law, no private person can proceed by a popular action (actio popularis). It was 
further held that the acliones populaces has become obsolete in the sense that a person is not 
entitled to protect the rights of the public or champion the cause of the people. On the same 
subject, it was held in Nasionale Party.SWA v Konslilusionale Raad (supra) that a person asserting 
the rights of the general public has to show a personal interest, that is personal prejudice to satisfy 
the requirements of standing.
Establishing the required interest is likely to pose a significant problem to groups seeking 
to litigate. In Standard General Insurance Company Limited v Gutman No and Ors 29 it was held 
that an indirect interest in the right sought to be asserted will not suffice. In Christian League of
Jolowicz; op cit. 227.
27 1987(3) SA 544.
28 1975(2) SA 294.
29 1981(2) SA  426.
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Southern Africa v RALL30 , an application for the appointment of a curator ad litem to
represent the interests of an unborn child of the respondent’s daughter, which unborn child had 
been conceived when the respondent’s daughter was raped, was made. The applicant was an 
organisation whose objects included the promotion of the Christian faith, morals and ethics. It 
was alleged that the protection of the unborn child was pertinent to Christian morals and ethics. 
The court found that the applicant had not shown any link with the unborn child in whose 
interests the application was brought. It was held that the applicant had shown no legal interest 
on the grounds on which it had locus standi in judicio. This case typifies the problem that a group 
seeking to litigate is likely to encounter. Establishing sufficient interest where the group is 
representing the interests of a member is likely to prove problematic.
An interesting formulation of the standing requirement was made in the case of Deary 
N.O. v The Acting President of Rhodesia and Ors.* 31 Section 3 (2) of the Emergency Powers 
(Special Courts Martial: Martial Law) Regulations,1978 authorised the execution outside areas 
subject to martial law of persons condemned to death by special courts martial within those areas. 
Applicant who represented an organisation connected with the Roman Catholic Church applied 
for an interdict prohibiting such executions. It was argued that Applicant had no locus standi. It 
was held that Applicant had locus standi to bring the application in view of the seriousness of the 
abuse alleged by him, the financial and other circumstances of the condemned persons and their 
relatives and the fact that some of these persons were probably Roman Catholics. At page 203. 
Beck J as he was then, had this to say:
The non-frivolous allegation of a systematic  disregard for so precious a r ight as the r ight of life is an allegation 
of an abuse so intolerable t h a t  the  court  will not fe tter  itself by pedantically  circumscribing the  class of persons 
who may request the  relief of these interdicts.  In the m a t te r  now before me the people in whose interest the 
applicant  has b rought  this application may well include impecunious and unsophist ica ted  tr ibes-people  who all 
live in isolated areas far from the seat of the court  and whose freedom of action and movement may be or may 
be th ough t  by th em  to be severely circumscribed by the  application of m artial  law to the  areas in which they 
reside. In my view this suffices to clothe the  applicant  with the  necessary locus s tand i  to bring an action of this 
na tu re
This is a robust and expansive formulation of the standing requirement. The judge 
considered the importance of the right asserted in deciding whether or not the applicant had 
standing. Further, he considered the circumstances of the people whose interests the applicant 
sought to represent. This is a proper formulation of the standing requirement in actions involving 
groups. Courts should view the standing requirement not as a mere procedural requirement, but 
should also consider the merits of each case before deciding the issue of standing. The seriousness 
of the right asserted and the circumstances of the members of the groups or the people the group 
seeks to represent should be of paramount importance in the determination of the standing 
requirement.
(d) Res Judicata
According to Order 13,Rule 89(3), a judgment given in representative proceedings is 
binding on all persons represented but shall not be enforced against any person not a party to the 
proceedings except with the leave of court. According to Rule 89 (5), the person against whom 
the judgment or order has been made may dispute liability to have the judgment or order enforced 
against him on the ground that by reason of facts and matters particular to his case he is entitled 
to be exempted from such liability.
The above provisions deal with the issue of res judicata. Under Rule 89 (3), a member of 
the group represented will be bound by the findings of the court. It means that no member or
30
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members of the group can withdraw after judgment and claim that he or they are not bound by 
the findings of the court. If they attempt to bring another action later on, they will be met with 
a special plea that the "whole of the legal rights and obligations of the parties are concluded by 
the earlier judgment and that the plaintiff is stopped by the findings of fact involved in the earlier 
judgment,"as laid down in Flood v Taylor,32
The plea of res judicata assumes a lot of importance in actions involving large groups. 
The possibility of a member or members of the groups withdrawing after judgment in 
dissatisfaction is higher with larger groups than smaller groups. The issue needs to be seriously 
addressed for purposes of group litigation.
The need for reform
From this analysis, it becomes obvious that the law as it currently stands has very little room for 
groups that seek to protect or vindicate their rights through the legal system. Such a position is 
unacceptable in a society in which the political economy of the country excludes the majority of 
the people from enjoying access to the courts through excessive costs and formalities. If as 
individuals, people do not enjoy access to the courts, they should be permitted access as a group. 
If they have rights they enjoy individually, there is no rhyme nor reason why they should not be 
allowed to aggregate their actions. The need for reform is therefore self-evident.
The dangers of collective representation should not be overlooked. The individual may 
find himself unrepresented or misrepresented.33 Another danger that has been mentioned in 
connection with group litigation is the possibility of abuse by groups that may employ it to force 
the other party to settle out of court rather than incur the adverse publicity that group actions 
often attract.34
Any proposed reform should address itself to problem areas mentioned earlier. These
include:
(a) the need to liberalise standing requirements so as to permit groups to represent 
their own interests as a collective or those of their members.
(b) the modification or replacement of the indemnity rule in group actions;
(c) an extension of remedies that are available to groups. The equivalent of Rule 89 
in England has been restrictively interpreted to permit groups to seek interdicts 
and declaratory orders but not damages. Damages should be made available to 
groups. Groups should be permitted to separate the issue of liability from the issue 
of damages. Once the groups has established liability, individual claims for 
damages could then be considered.
(d) the clarification of the issue of res judicata.
Additionally, a screening procedure similar to the one found in Rule 2.3 of the United 
States Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, should be considered.35 Rule 23 stipulates that before 
an action is maintained, it should be subject to judicial approval or certification. This is designed 
to ensure that unfounded actions are not allowed to proceed and that the procedure is not used as 
a form of legalised blackmail.36
Under Rule 23, a number of conditions need to be satisfied before a class or group action 
can be certified. These are:
*  1978 RLR 230.
33 C appelletti and G arth, op. cit 112.
34 See Van Beuren, (1983) Legal A ction Group, 9.
See Van Beuren and Chayes for a discussion of Rule 23.
Van Beuren, op. cit a t 9.
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(a) the class or group must be so large that joinder is impracticable;
(b) there must be questions of law and fact common to the group or class;
(c) the representative parties must fairly and adequately represent the class.
In addition to the above, the class or group action is allowed where:
(i) separate actions would impair or impede other group members’ interests;or
(ii) separate actions would lead to judgments establishing varying standards of 
conductor
(iii) an interdict or declaratory relief would be suitable for the entire group.
If reform on the lines suggested above is introduced, the role of the courts would need to 
be modified and extended. In addition to being dispute or conflict settlement fora courts would 
have to play a managerial role. They would have to be managers of the group action,especially 
when it comes to the issue of determining damages suffered by the different members of the 
group and the subsequent disbursements. One can envisage a situation where some members of 
the group may choose to accept out of court settlements offered by the defendant while others 
may choose to have their rights and entitlements decided by the court. If such a situation arose, 
the courts would have to depart from their traditional role as conflict resolution fora and become 
managers and paymasters. Courts would therefore have to play a more active and affirmative role 
than they are presently playing.
The reforms suggested above are piecemeal ones which have been introduced and adopted 
in advanced capitalist countries. They seek to ameliorate the injustices inherent in traditional legal 
rights, remedies and procedures. Since they have their genesis in developed capitalist countries, 
would it be wise and realistic to prescribe them for developing countries such as Zimbabwe? Are 
they not culturally and historically specific to those countries where they have their origins? 
Would it not be a case of prescribing old wine for new wine skins0
Developing countries face socio-economic problems which call for radical rather than 
piecemeal reforms. Social relations in these countries are characterised by inequality in the 
distribution of wealth, exploitation, abject poverty, illiteracy, ignorance, poor and inadequate 
health services, state repression and administrative inefficiency. Victims of the above conditions 
have no meaningful rights and remedies under the traditional legal system. What is needed 
therefore, are legal reforms which have, as their target, the various disadvantaged sections of 
society, and which seek to promote socio-economic and political transformation. An example of 
such legal reforms are the reforms that have been evolved and developed by the Supreme Court 
of India. These reforms have been described as social action litigation.37 What follows is a brief 
discussion of these reforms.
Social action litigation is a product of three interrelated developments; viz:
(i) judicial activism in the Indian Supreme Court,
(ii) the social justice approach to the interpretation of fundamental rights enshrined in the
constitution, and
(iii) participatory justice,38
For a discussion on social action litigation, see Justice Bhagw ati,” Fundam ental Rights In Their 
Econom ic, Social and Cultural C ontext”, in Developing Human R ights Jurisprudence, The Domestic 
Application of International Human Rights Norms, Commonwealth Secretariat, 1988 and also Baxi,” 
1982 (No 29) International Commission of Jurists Review. 37.
Bhagw ati, op. cit, 58.
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Since these reforms are "judge led and even judge-induced",39 it is convenient to start 
by discussing judicial activism. However, it is not possible to put the three developments into neat 
compartments. The categorisation adopted here is for purposes of convenience and as such, it will 
not be slavishly stuck to.
Judges of the Indian Supreme Court have sought to depart from the traditional function 
of judges which is to interpret and apply the law as it exists.40 Finding themselves in the midst 
of inequality, abject poverty, illiteracy and ignorance and repression, they have refused to 
interpret and apply the existing law knowing that such application and interpretation would result 
in injustice to the masses of people. To this end, they have initiated a movement for juridical 
democracy through innovative uses of judicial power.41
Basically, the innovative uses of judicial power is encapsulated in the social justice 
approach to the interpretation of fundamental rights enshrined in the constitution. While not 
underrating the importance of civil and political rights championed by the West, the Indian 
Supreme Court has realised that these rights are meaningless to the majority of people in the 
developing world who suffer from exploitation, repression and administrative inefficiency. The 
court has realised that social and economic rights which focus on socio-economic transformation 
are more relevant to the disadvantaged than civil and political rights.42
In the light of the above realisation, some judges of the Supreme Court such as Justices 
Krishner Iyer and Bhagwati began converting much of constitutional litigation into social action 
litigation through a variety of techniques of juristic activism.43 In their interpretation of 
fundamental rights, they have shifted their focus from the bureaucratic abuse of rights approach 
to the social justice approach. This shift of focus has resulted in an expansion in the frontiers of 
fundamental rights.44 According to the social justice approach, fundamental rights have been 
interpreted as imposing affirmative obligations on the state instead of merely imposing negative 
restraints on the powers of the state.45 Thus where the state is held to have violated 
fundamental rights, it is required to perform an affirmative act to remedy the violation.
One of the techniques which has been adopted in the interpretation of fundamental rights 
has been to place reliance on international human rights instruments such as the International 
Convention on Civil and Political Rights. The result has been the incorporation of international 
human rights norms into domestic law through a process of judicial interpretation.
It is necessary at this stage to give a few examples of the court’s decisions. The court has 
held that insistence on monetary bail in a case of a poor accused would be inconsistent with 
reasonable, fair and just procedure so far as the poor accused is concerned. This is in violation of 
Section 21 of the Indian Constitution which provides that no person shall be deprived of his life 
or personal liberty except by procedure established by law. The court has also held that in a 
criminal case where the accused’s life or personal liberty is in danger, it is a violation of Article 
21 of the Indian Constitution to proceed to try him without giving him proper and adequate legal 
representation if the accused is too poor or ignorant to afford legal representation. The court thus 
requires the state to provide free legal assistance to poor accused.46
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What is of particular relevance for our purposes is the innovative and creative extension 
of the doctrine of locus standi so as to ensure that the underprivileged have access to justice. The 
court realised that access to justice is a fundamental right to the underprivileged sections of 
society. The doctrine of locus standi provides that an action can only be commenced by the person 
who has suffered injury. In habeas corpus petitions, the court usually acts on a letter written by 
or on behalf of the detainee.47 Because of the detainee’s inability to petition the court and the 
importance attached to the right to freedom, exceptions have been made to the general rule to 
allow other people to petition the court on the detainee’s behalf.
Under Justice Bhagwati’s direction, the Indian Supreme Court extended the technique 
employed in habeas corpus petitions to disadvantaged sections of society.48 The doctrine of 
locus standi has been extended to allow any public spirited person who is aware of any injury that 
has been suffered by a person or group of persons who are unable by reason of poverty, ignorance 
or any other socio-economic handicap, to bring an action seeking judicial redress for the injury 
caused to such person or class of people. This can be done by addressing a letter to the court.49
The Supreme court has thus evolved a new jurisdiction; the "epistolary jurisdiction". This 
new jurisdiction has been rightly called a "momentous social invention" .50 Through the 
epistolary jurisdiction, the court has opened its doors to underprivileged women and juveniles, 
workers, prisoners awaiting trial and many other disadvantaged sections of society.
What are the lessons that can be learnt from developments in India? The most important 
lesson is that the potential, and indeed the capacity, for reform lies in the legal actors, institutions, 
laws and legal strategies. The Indian Supreme court has demonstrated that judges who are 
courageous, resourceful, and above all, who are not tradition-bound, can perform a lot within the 
existing legal and institutional constraints. What we need in Zimbabwe are judges and lawyers who 
are courageous, resourceful and iconoclastic. We need legal actors whose vision of law is not static 
but dynamic, actors who will fashion the law in an innovative and resourceful manner and make 
it responsive to the demands and cries of the masses of people.
In discussing law reform, the nature and character of law need to be properly appreciated. 
Law in general individualises, atomises and disarticulates social class struggle into individual 
grievances and disputes.51 Reform should address itself to the above aspects of law. Group 
litigation is one method of democratising law and therefore a method of legal struggle for 
democratic rights. By aggregating their actions or demands, the dispossessed and disadvantaged 
seek to use the law to reverse the individualisation and disarticulation of social class struggles into 
individual grievances that is built into legal formalities and techniques. Group litigation serves to 
mobilise, organise and conscientise those who are beyond the pale of the law and the legal system.
Conclusion
The door-keepers who jealously stand guard before the law are too powerful for the poor, lone 
man from the country. He has waited patiently by the door in the hope that he will be granted 
admittance to the law. His waiting has been in vain. It is time for the man from the country to 
realise that he will not be granted admittance in spite of his long wait. The only way to gain 
admittance is through struggle. Since the door-keepers are too powerful for him, he should seek 
the assistance of other men who, like him, seek admittance to the law but are denied by the
B axi, op. c it, 40.
^  B axi, op. c it , 40.
Bhagw ati, "Human R ights A s Evolved by the Jurisprudence of the Supreme Court o f India" 1987 
(Vol. 13) Com m onwealth Law Bulletin , 236 at 244.
60 B axi, op. c it, 40.
51 Shivji I. G ., op. c it, 120.
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powerful guards. For men like him, strength lies in numbers.
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